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It is to be noted that each of the applicants in Grepe v Loam had enjoyed access to the
court and indeed, had been through a full trial. The order was one which restrained
further applications in actions which had already been tried.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the power to make such orders was well-
established. In Lord Kinnaird v Field [1905] 2 Ch 306, a case providing a good
illustration of how vexatious litigants can have a disastrous impact on the other parties
and on the system,
Vaughan Williams LJ stated: "No question can possibly be raised
as to the jurisdiction of the learned judge to make (such an order)."
Stirling LJ
explained that the order "is really an example of the mode in which the Court
interferes to prevent abuse of its process".
It has since been widely accepted that such orders are soundly based. The court
plainly has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its process in relation to a case
of which it is seised. This is reflected, for instance in O 18 r 19 and the inherent
jurisdiction familiarly invoked for striking out proceedings which are an abuse of the
process. The availability of Grepe v Loam orders has supplied the absence of
jurisdiction to react to vexatious applications (as opposed to the vexatious institution
of proceedings) not provided for by section 27.
Notes
"The defendant had made some twenty-nine interlocutory applications with reference to pleadings,
discovery, and the like; he had moved to strike out the statement of claim on the grounds (1) that the
words ‘Delivered the ...... day of ......' appeared at the end instead of the beginning; (2) that the claim
was printed with a margin of an inch and a half instead of two inches; and (3) because the number of
folios was printed at the top instead of at the side. He had also made applications for particulars
covering almost every paragraph of the statement of claim. In eighteen cases the defendant had been
ordered to pay the costs; in four cases the plaintiffs were to have their costs in any event; and the
remaining seven cases proved abortive, either because the notice of motion was irregular or given for
a wrong day, or because the defendant did not appear when the time for making the motion or
supporting his application arrived. None of the costs he had been ordered to pay had been paid by the
defendant......" (at 306)
At 309.
Ibid.
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